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H A B E A S C 0 R P US
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by Daniel D. Blinka
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professor of law at Marquette
University Law School,
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ISSUES
Under what circumstances may a
federal court of appeals raise a
state-law, procedural-default defense
on its own initiative - sua sponte
- in a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding? If an appeals court finds a
procedural default, is it foreclosed
from reviewing the habeas petition-
er's claim on the merits?
FACTS
This is a tale of two different cases
in two different states at two differ-
ent times. Richard Trest wants to
challenge his 1979 conviction and
sentence for armed robbery in
Louisiana, but the heart of his case
relates to his 1976 burglary
convictions in Mississippi.
In May 1976, Trest, who was 18 at
the time, pleaded guilty in Mississippi
state court to five counts of bur-
glary. The Mississippi court sen-
tenced him to concurrent four-year
sentences.
At no time did Trest appeal or oth-
erwise attack the validity of the
Mississippi convictions. Mississippi
released Trest in early 1978.
Trest did not avoid trouble for long.
In 1979, he found himself in neigh-
boring Louisiana, where he was
charged and subsequently convicted
by a jury of robbing a grocery store.
Trest's prior Mississippi convictions
qualified him for habitual-offender
status under Louisiana law. Based
on the Mississippi burglary convic-
tions, the Louisiana court sentenced
Trest to 35 years in prison without
the possibility of parole, probation,
or suspended sentence.
At no time during the Louisiana
sentencing proceedings did Trest
object to use of the Mississippi
convictions. Moreover, he did not
suggest that the convictions were
invalid on any ground.
Trest appealed his armed robbery
conviction, but the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed it on direct
review. Trest filed motions for post-
conviction relief in Louisiana state
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court in 1981, 1983, 1990, and
1994; all were denied.
In 1991, Trest filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court. Following prevailing
procedures, Trest's petition was
reviewed initially by a magistrate
judge who would issue a report and
recommendation to the district
judge.
Trest's federal habeas petition
repeated the nine identical claims
that had been denied by Louisiana
courts in the 1990 post-conviction
proceedings. In one of these claims,
Trest contended that the Louisiana
court erred by relying on the earlier
Mississippi convictions. He argued
that the Mississippi convictions
were constitutionally invalid and
should not have been used as
habitual-offender predicates. In par-
ticular, the Mississippi convictions
were infirm, Trest contended,
because the trial court erred by fail-
ing to advise him of various rights
(e.g., the maximum sentence, the
right to appeal, and the right to
counsel on appeal) prior to accept-
ing his guilty plea.
The State of Louisiana responded to
Trest's habeas petition but did not
explicitly address his attack on the
Mississippi convictions. For his part,
the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation to the district
court, which recommended that the
petition be denied, did not address
Trest's challenge to his Mississippi
convictions.
Trest objected to the magistrate
judge's report and recommendation
on a number of grounds. While
reasserting his arguments about the
invalidity of the Mississippi convic-
tions, Trest conceded that his earli-
er claim had been "obscure" and
"unskillful." Then for the first time
Trest alleged that the Mississippi
pleas were not intelligently and vol-
untarily made as required under
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969). Denying the writ of habeas
corpus in an unpublished decision,
the federal district court rejected
this and other challenges.
Trest appealed to the Fifth Circuit
which affirmed the district court's
decision by a two-to-one vote.
Writing for the majority, Judge
Edith Jones never got to the sub-
stance of Trest's claims because the
majority held that Trest was proce-
durally barred from even challeng-
ing the basis of his habitual-offender
sentencing.
The majority explained that it was
precluded from reviewing Trest's
challenge by an earlier Fifth Circuit
decision in Sones v. Hargett, 61
F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 1995). Indeed the
majority found it inexplicable that
neither party discussed or even
cited Sones.
Sones construed a Mississippi
statute that limited collateral chal-
lenges to convictions and sentences.
(As a general matter, a collateral
challenge focuses on the procedures
under which an individual was con-
victed, not on the individual's guilt
or innocence. A petition for a writ
of habeas corpus is the most widely
known type of collateral challenge.)
In the context of this case,
Mississippi convictions before April
17, 1984, can be challenged collat-
erally only if a petition for post-
conviction relief was filed by April
17, 1987. Sones clearly extended
the Mississippi procedural bar to
challenges against convictions trig-
gering habitual-offender status
under Mississippi law.
Trest's stiff 1979 Louisiana sentence
was predicated on his 1976
Mississippi burglary convictions. Yet
at no time between 1976 and April
1987 did Trest challenge those con-
victions. The Fifth Circuit majority
concluded that Trest's claims could
not be heard in Mississippi state
court because of his own procedural
default and that federal courts like-
wise were barred from considering
those claims.
The majority observed that Sones
provides some escape when the fed-
eral habeas petitioner can demon-
strate cause and prejudice for the
default or show that a fundamental
miscarriage of justice will result if
the petitioner's claims are not scru-
tinized. Trest alleged neither excuse
and so could not take advantage of
this exception. 94 F.3d 1005
(5th Cir. 1996).
Judge Robert Parker dissented. He
argued that the Louisiana court did
not explicitly rely on the Mississippi
rule and that Trest never had the
opportunity to rebut the presump-
tion that the rule bars consideration
of his claims. 94 F.3d at 1009.
The issue is now before the
Supreme Court, which granted
Trest's petition for a writ of certio-
rari. 117 S. Ct. 1842 (1997).
CASE ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit seemed somewhat
astonished that neither party dis-
cussed the Sones case. Sones
involved a Mississippi man who
was sentenced under that state's
habitual-offender statute to life in
prison without parole. Sones filed a
federal habeas corpus petition alleg-
ing that his trial counsel was inef-
fective, but the federal court ruled
that the claim was time barred
because it had not been filed prior
to the April 1987 deadline.
The Mississippi procedural bar
reflects a policy against retrying the
offenses used to trigger a habitual-
offender statute. Under that policy,
a frontal assault on the legality of a
prior conviction should be conduct-
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ed in an entirely separate proceed-
ing; the challenge should not be sad-
dled on a trial judge in a hearing to
determine habitual-offender status.
Trest seemed astonished that the
Fifth Circuit raised Sones on its
own and felt constrained to follow
it, jot for jot. Trest raises two lines
of attack.
Trest first claims that the Fifth
Circuit erred in invoking the
Mississippi procedural-default rule
on its own motion. Fundamental
fairness embraces the right to be
notified and given an opportunity to
respond. The Fifth Circuit, Trest
charges, violated these due process
principles by invoking the
Mississippi rule without giving him
notice or any opportunity to be
heard. Trest suggests that his failure
to demonstrate the absence of a
procedural default or show cause
and prejudice is attributable to the
Fifth Circuit's denial of his due
process rights, which alone requires
reversal.
Second, Trest argues that the Fifth
Circuit was not compelled to raise
the procedural-default issue on its
own motion and erred in concluding
that it could not address Trest's
underlying claims. Here Trest raises
the general rule that procedural
defaults usually are treated as
affirmative defenses that are waived
if not asserted, as they were not by
Louisiana in this case.
Trest concedes that several other
courts of appeals hold that a federal
court may raise sua sponte a proce-
dural default not asserted by a gov-
ernment defendant. But no court,
he argues, holds that a federal court
is required to raise the defense
sua sponte or is barred from
reviewing the merits when there
is a procedural default.
Finally, Trest argues, Louisiana
waived the right to assert the
Mississippi procedural-default rule.
He points out that Louisiana let pass
multiple opportunities to assert the
bar and has never suggested that it
has an interest separate and apart
from Mississippi's in enforcing
the rule.
Louisiana argues, as would be
expected, that the Fifth Circuit's
decision is correct. The State relies
on Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S.
129 (1987), which recognized that
federal courts have the authority to
raise the procedural-default defense
on their own motion; that is, a fed-
eral court can invoke the bar in
order to promote the interests of
federalism, despite a state's failure
to assert it.
Such decisions should be made on a
case-by-case basis, in the exercise
of sound discretion. In this case,
says Louisiana, both the district
and the appeals court properly exer-
cised their discretion to protect
Mississippi's interest regardless of
Louisiana's failure to raise its sister
state's procedural bar.
Once the Fifth Circuit invoked the
procedural-default defense, Trest
was required by Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991),
ABA PREVIEW 228 (March 19, 1991),
to demonstrate either cause and
prejudice or show that failure to
consider the merits of his claim will
result in a fundamental miscarriage
of justice. As to Trest's assertion
that he has been denied notice and
opportunity to address the proce-
dural-default issue, Louisiana accus-
es Trest of attempting to "sandbag"
state and federal courts by failing to
clearly raise the issue earlier.
SIGNIFICANCE
Cutting through the Byzantine sub-
tleties of federal habeas corpus liti-
gation, this case raises three larger
issues. These issues relate to the
finality of criminal convictions, the
nature of our federal system, and
the limits of an adversary appellate
system.
First, Trest's case highlights recent
efforts to limit federal habeas review
of state prisoners' convictions. In
recent years, both the Supreme
Court and Congress have attempted
to abate the flood of federal habeas
cases. Procedural rules limiting the
number, timing, and content of
habeas challenges seek to impose
some finality in a legal system that
features seemingly endless appeals,
as happened in this case. Trest wait-
ed until the 1990s to raise various
challenges to his 1976 guilty pleas
to burglary. Along the way, he
enjoyed separate rights to appeal in
Mississippi and Louisiana and filed
four separate post-conviction
petitions in Louisiana state court.
Second, federalism involves the
relationship between the federal
government and the states as well as
the relationship among the separate
states. This case vividly illustrates
not just the duration but the tortu-
ousness of those federal habeas
actions that involve the integrity of
the criminal law of not one, but two
sovereign states.
The federalism issue is complicated,
however, by Lousiana's inaction in
this case. What responsibility does
Louisiana have to discover and raise
issues about Mississippi law? What
interests are promoted by enforcing
a Mississippi rule in a Louisiana
criminal proceeding? Are federal
courts specially obligated to step in
and protect one state's law
(Mississippi) even if another state
(Louisiana) neglects to do so?
(Continued on Page 114)
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If Louisiana goes to the trouble of
relying on Mississippi convictions to
support a habitual-offender sen-
tence, shouldn't it live with the
consequence of failing to raise
Mississippi's procedural bar - the
consequence that the defense is
waived?
The third issue also relates to the
relationship between the courts and
parties. Generally, parties who fail
to raise claims in a timely fashion
waive them. But parties are also
entitled to reasonable notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
Both parties in this case claim to
be victims of procedural outrages.
Trest rails against the Fifth Circuit
for what he described as "springing"
the Sones case on him. Had he had
some inkling that the court might
apply the Mississippi procedural-
default rule, Trest suggests that he
might have presented the case
differently.
Not to be outdone, Louisiana argues
that it was Trest himself who sand-
bagged the state and federal courts
over the past 20 years. In effect,
Trest "hid the ball," it argues, by
raising the Mississippi claims in a
tardy and convoluted way.
So, in deciding this case, the
Supreme Court has more to focus
on than the role of federal courts in
federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Despite the importance of validating
state criminal proceedings and
putting an end to cases, the Court is
being called on to apply the same
rules to both the habeas petitioner
and the habeas respondent. If the
habeas petitioner can be held to a
default rule, should the rule also
apply to the respondent?
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